THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

Fall 1990

A READER ON PUBLIC POLICY IN
THE INTER-RELATED FIELDS OF . . .

. . . HUMAN POPULATION

The Tragedy of the Commons
by Garrett Hardin

. . . INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Israel and the United States: A Common Problem
of Assimilating Immigrants
by Ira Mehlman

. . . LANGUAGE, ASSIMILATION, NATIONAL UNITY

Ghettoized by Black Unity
by Shelby Steele
Against Academic Apartheid
by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.

. . . BALANCING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AND CIVIC RESPONSIBILITIES

Building Community
by John W. Gardner

. . . ALL IN THE CONTEXT OF A SOCIAL CONTRACT.

PLUS BOOK REVIEWS AND GLEANINGS FROM THE DAILY PRESS

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Table of Contents

3 ..... EDITORIAL: WHY ANOTHER JOURNAL?
John H. Tanton, M.D.

5 ..... THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
Garrett Hardin

14 ..... AGAINST ACADEMIC APARTHEID
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr

17 ..... ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES:
A COMMON PROBLEM OF ASSIMILATING IMMIGRANTS
Ira H. Mehlman

25 ..... BUILDING COMMUNITY
John W. Gardner

30 ..... GHETTOIZED BY BLACK UNITY
Shelby Steele

33 ..... BOOK REVIEW
The Broken Cord by Michael Dorris

The Social Contract is published quarterly.
Editorial and subscription offices are at:
316 1/2 E. Mitchell Street
Petoskey, MI 49770
Institutional subscriptions are $35 per year;
Individual subscriptions - $25.
Second Class Postage is paid at Petoskey MI.
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WHY ANOTHER JOURNAL ?

Editorial

Over the past two decades, a number of issues have enjoyed public attention, all of which are directly or indirectly related to, or influenced by, the question of human population growth; its absolute size, distribution and rate of change.

The first of these was the population question itself, brought forcefully to the fore by Paul Ehrlich with the publication of The Population Bomb in the late 1960s. This was accompanied by the now-forgotten hearings on population problems by Alaska's Senator Gruening, and the appointment by President Nixon of the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future. In 1968, Dr. Ehrlich helped form Zero Population Growth as a vehicle for work on these issues.

During the 1970s, domestic birth rates fell and immigration rates rose, calling into existence in 1979 the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), when existing population groups declined to tackle the new issue of immigration policy. Then, as large scale immigration raised the specter of division along language and cultural lines, U.S.English entered the fray in 1983. Finally, as of the late 1980s, there developed a ground swell of concern throughout academe and society in general about the proper relationship of individuals to one another, and of the individual to the larger community we call society. Many looked at the problems of our society and began inquiring as to the corresponding responsibilities, duties and obligations that go along with our rights, liberties and entitlements, so much emphasized in the last two decades. This led to the formation of the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities (AARR). It is this theme of balance between rights and responsibilities that suggested we resurrect the phrase "The Social Contract" as the name for our journal, since so many of the questions we face are ethical and contractarian ones. Who gives, who gets, and how much?

I have singled out these organizations only because I'm the most familiar with them. Along the way many others have contributed to the dialogue: Population/ Environment Balance (nee The Environmental Fund), Negative Population Growth (NPG), Californians for Population Stabilization (CAPS), the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), the Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI), to mention a few on the U.S. domestic level. In addition, there is another set of groups working on the international scene.

In the development and elaboration of any social idea, literary efforts of different types are needed. In general, the groups mentioned above have been strong on the production of short tracts and newsletters, and have generated a few books, but very few of the magazine-length articles that would fill in the gap between these two extremes. In addition, such articles as have been produced are widely scattered, being just occasional items in publications with other chief foci.

The lack of any journal dealing with these related topics has meant that there has been no epicenter for their discussion, and no coherent body of literature to which staff people who come along can be referred. Older items of lasting value tend to be lost from view - that is one reason we are re-publishing Garrett Hardin's celebrated essay, The Tragedy of the Commons, in this, our initial issue. Many of us would benefit from reading it again, and many of the generation that follows mine, to whom the standard must be passed, will never have read it at all.

The absence of a journal has meant that it is harder for new young authors to find a place to publish their nascent ideas. It has also meant the absence of an editor, one of whose main jobs would be to look over the whole field, to see which ideas are weak or missing, and to solicit articles to treat them. Some of these might be assigned to those new, young writers wanting to get started, to help them develop their talents and reputation. Finally, many of us have articles and other items we would like to share with colleagues, but few of us have the facilities or financing to do much of the time-consuming copying, collating and mailing. This leaves us all at a disadvantage.

These deficiencies, then, give us our general publication plan:

1. We will use a great deal of reprinted material,

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drawn from a wide variety of sources, in an effort to develop a collected body of writing on our topics. Our contributing editors have among themselves agreed to survey about sixty publications, and send us items to be considered for republication.

2. Since the past is prologue to the present, in each issue we intend to present some items from the recent or more distant past that bear on our general subject areas. Sometimes the wheel has already been invented!

3. In a departure from common journal practice, we plan to reprint good items from the daily press, including syndicated columnists, and possibly with letters-to-the-editor responses to their articles.

4. Speeches, memos, testimonies, and the like that should see wider distribution will also be included.

5. The publication will contain the standard items of an editorial, letters to the journal, and gradually, over time, more of the original articles that we solicit to fill the gaps in our information and understanding.

The journal will not be refereed as we have no academic pretensions. This is a publication of activists, by activists, for activists: people in the daily battles who want some return for their efforts in the not-too-distant future. We will also solicit items from our "opposition," seeking to offer debates in print.

Thus, The Social Contract, as we envision it, is a bit unusual in format - which we hope will make it all the more useful to you. When you run across an item that you would like others to see but find you just don't have the time, energy or facilities to copy and send around, send it to us and let us take care of that function for you. We invite contributors to send along with these submissions a paragraph or two on why they feel this particular item should be seen by others (if the reason is not obvious on its face). We will use these to prepare an introductory note.

Our goal is not to increase your reading load but to decrease it some since our contributing editors, through their survey of a wide range of literature, will be doing some work for you. Their work will also, doubtless, bring to your attention items that you would otherwise miss. Who can keep up with a dozen publications, much less sixty?

This journal is available to the general public through subscription, and we hope that some organizations may wish to offer and promote it to their membership. We hope, too, that the "opposition" will come to feel it is something they MUST read in order to keep track of what we're thinking.

CRITERION FOR SUCCESS

Our sole criterion for success will be the usefulness of the journal to the activists who receive it. An important measure of this will be their response in the form of items sent in for inclusion in the journal. Since this is not a commercial venture, the size of the circulation will be of little import. Its effect will be the measure of its success.

So, here we go!

John H. Tanton, M.D.

He who molds public sentiment
goes deeper than he who enacts
statutes or pronounces decisions.
He makes statutes or decisions
possible or impossible to execute.

--- Abraham Lincoln during
the Lincoln-Douglas debates

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"What's past is prologue." So wrote William Shakespeare in "The Tempest". In honor of Garrett Hardin's 75th birthday THE SOCIAL CONTRACT *proudly reprints his seminal article "The Tragedy of the Commons" in which he argues cogently for the ethics of "carrying capacity." Dr. Hardin is a former professor of biology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. This is the best known of his many writings on population topics, which have played a central role in shaping thinking and action in population matters. In keeping with a judgment that each generation of activists needs to know the best of past scholarship, we have selected Professor Hardin's work as our "What's Past Is Prologue" item for this first issue.*

THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

By Garrett Hardin

At the end of a thoughtful article on the future of nuclear war, Wiesner and York(1) concluded that: "Both sides in the arms race are...confronted by the dilemma of steadily increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security. It is our considered professional judgment that this dilemma has no technical solution. If the great powers continue to look for solutions in the area of science and technology only, the result will be to worsen the situation."

I would like to focus your attention not on the subject of the article (national security in a nuclear world) but on the kind of conclusion they reached, namely that there is no technical solution to the problem. An implicit and almost universal assumption of discussions published in professional and semipopular scientific journals is that the problem under discussion has a technical solution. A technical solution may be defined as one that requires a change only in the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of change in human values or ideas of morality.

In our day (though not in earlier times) technical solutions are always welcome. Because of previous failures in prophecy, it takes courage to assert that a desired technical solution is not possible. Wiesner and York exhibited this courage; publishing in a science journal, they insisted that the solution to the problem was not to be found in the natural sciences. They cautiously qualified their statement with the phrase, "It is our considered professional judgment..." Whether they were right or not is not the concern of the present article. Rather, the concern here is with the important concept of a class of human problems which can be called "no technical solution problems," and, more specifically, with the identification and discussion of one of these.

It is easy to show that the class is not a null class. Recall the game of tick-tack-toe. Consider the problem, "How can I win the game of tick-tack-toe?" It is well known that I cannot, if I assume (in keeping with the conventions of game theory) that my opponent understands the game perfectly. Put another way, there is no "technical solution" to the problem. I can win only by giving radical meaning to the word "win." I can hit my opponent over the head; or I can drug him; or I can falsify the records. Every way in which I "win" involves, in some sense, an abandonment of the game, as we intuitively understand it. (I can also, of course, openly abandon the game - refuse to play it. This is what most adults do.)

The class of "No technical solution problems" has members. My thesis is that the "population problem," as conventionally conceived, is a member of this class. How it is conventionally conceived needs some comment. It is fair to say that most people who anguish over the population problem are trying to find a way to avoid the evils of over-population without relinquishing any of the privileges they now enjoy. They think that farming the seas or developing new strains of wheat will

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"The Tragedy of the Commons", originally given as an address to the Pacific Division of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, is copyright by the AAAS and is reprinted with their permission from SCIENCE *13 December 1968, vol. 162, pp. 1243-48.*

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solve the problem - technologically. I try to show here that the solution they seek cannot be found. The population problem cannot be solved in a technical way, any more than can the problem of winning the game of tick-tack-toe.

WHAT SHALL WE MAXIMIZE?

Population, as Malthus said, naturally tends to grow "geometrically," or, as we would now say, exponentially. In a finite world this means that the per capita share of the world's goods must steadily decrease. Is ours a finite world?

A fair defense can be put forward for the view that the world is infinite; or that we do not know that it is not. But, in terms of the practical problems that we must face in the next few generations with the foreseeable technology, it is clear that we will greatly increase human misery if we do not, during the immediate future, assume that the world available to the terrestrial human population is finite. "Space" is no escape(2).

A finite world can support only a finite population; therefore, population growth must eventually equal zero. (The case of perpetual wide fluctuations above and below zero is a trivial variant that need not be discussed.) When this condition is met, what will be the situation of mankind? Specifically, can Bentham's goal of "the greatest good for the greatest number" be realized?

No - for two reasons, each sufficient by itself. The first is a theoretical one. It is not mathematically possible to maximize for two (or more) variables at the same time. This was clearly stated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern(3), but the principle is implicit in the theory of partial differential equations, dating back at least to D'Alembert (1717-1783).

The second springs directly from biological facts. To live, any organism must have a source of energy (for example, food). This energy is utilized for two purposes: mere maintenance and work. For man, maintenance of life requires about 1600 kilocalories a day ("maintenance calories"). Anything that he does over and above merely staying alive will be defined as work, and is supported by "work calories" which he takes in. Work calories are used not only for what we call work in common speech; they are also required for all forms of enjoyment, from swimming and automobile racing to playing music and writing poetry. If our goal is to maximize population it is obvious what we must do: We must make the work calories per person approach as close to zero as possible. No gourmet meals, no vacations, no sports, no music, no literature, no art. ...I think that everyone will grant, without argument or proof, that maximizing population does not maximize goods. Bentham's goal is impossible.

In reaching this conclusion I have made the usual assumption that it is the acquisition of energy that is the problem. The appearance of atomic energy has led some to question this assumption. However, given an infinite source of energy, population growth still produces an inescapable problem. The problem of the acquisition of energy is replaced by the problem of its dissipation, as J. H. Fremlin has so wittily shown(4). The arithmetic signs in analysis are, as it were, reversed; but Bentham's goal is still unobtainable.

The optimum population is, then, less than the maximum. The difficulty of defining the optimum is enormous; so far as I know, no one has seriously tackled this problem. Reaching an acceptable and stable solution will surely require more than one generation of hard analytical work - and much persuasion.

We want the maximum good per person; but what is good? To one person it is wilderness, to another it is ski lodges for thousands. To one it is estuaries to nourish ducks for hunters to shoot; to another it is factory land. Comparing one good with another is, we usually say, impossible because goods are incommensurable. Incommensurables cannot be compared.

Theoretically this may be true; but in real life incommensurables are commensurable. Only a criterion of judgment and a system of weighting are needed. In nature the criterion is survival. Is it better for a species to be small and hideable, or large and powerful? Selection commensurates the incommensurables. The compromise achieved depends on a natural weighting of the values of the variables.

"A finite world can support only a finite population"

Man must imitate this process. There is no doubt that in fact he already does, but unconsciously. It is when the hidden decisions are made explicit that the arguments begin. The problem for the years ahead is to work out an acceptable theory of weighting. Synergistic effects, nonlinear variation, and difficulties in discounting the

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future make the intellectual problem difficult, but not (in principle) insoluble.

Has any cultural group solved this practical problem at the present time, even on an intuitive level? One simple fact proves that none has: there is no prosperous population in the world today that has, and has had for some time, a growth rate of zero. Any people that has intuitively identified its optimum point will soon reach it, after which its growth rate becomes and remains zero.

Of course, a positive growth rate might be taken as evidence that a population is below its optimum. However, by any reasonable standards, the most rapidly growing populations on earth today are (in general) the most miserable. This association (which need not be invariable) casts doubt on the optimistic assumption that the positive growth rate of a population is evidence that it has yet to reach its optimum.

We can make little progress in working toward optimum population size until we explicitly exorcise the spirit of Adam Smith in the field of practical demography. In economic affairs, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) popularized the "invisible hand," the idea that an individual who "intends only his own gain," is, as it were, "led by an invisible hand to promote...the public interest"(5). Adam Smith did not assert that this was invariably true, and perhaps neither did any of his followers. But he contributed to a dominant tendency of thought that has ever since interfered with positive action based on rational analysis, namely, the tendency to assume that decisions reached individually will, in fact, be the best decisions for an entire society. If this assumption is correct it justifies the continuance of our present policy of laissez-faire in reproduction. If it is correct we can assume that men will control their individual fecundity so as to produce the optimum population. If the assumption is not correct, we need to reexamine our individual freedoms to see which ones are defensible.

TRAGEDY OF FREEDOM IN A COMMONS

The rebuttal to the invisible hand in population control can be found in a scenario first sketched in a little-known pamphlet(6) in 1833 by a mathematical amateur named William Forster Lloyd (1794-1852). We may well call it "the tragedy of the commons," using the word "tragedy" as the philosopher Whitehead used it(7): "The essence of dramatic tragedy is not unhappiness. It resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things." He then goes on to say, "This inevitableness of destiny can only be illustrated in terms of human life by incidents which in fact involve unhappiness. For it is only by them that the futility of escape can be made evident in the drama."

The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.

As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly, or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks: "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component.

1) The positive component is the function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.

2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of -1.

Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another. ...But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.

Some would say that this is a platitude. Would that it were! In a sense, it was learned thousands of years ago, but natural selection favors the forces of psychological denial(8). The individual benefits as an individual from his ability to deny the truth even though society as a whole, of which he is a part, suffers. Education can counteract the natural tendency to do the wrong thing,

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but the inexorable succession of generations requires that the basis for this knowledge be constantly refreshed.

A simple incident that occurred a few years ago in Leominster, Massachusetts, shows how perishable the knowledge is. During the Christmas shopping season the parking meters downtown were covered with plastic bags that bore tags reading: "Do not open until after Christmas. Free parking courtesy of the mayor and city council." In other words, facing the prospect of an increased demand for already scarce space, the city fathers reinstituted the system of the commons. (Cynically, we suspect that they gained more votes than they lost in this retrogressive act.)

In an approximate way, the logic of the commons has been understood for a long time, perhaps since the discovery of agriculture or the invention of private property in real estate. But it is understood mostly only in special cases which are not sufficiently generalized. Even at this late date, cattlemen leasing national land on the western ranges demonstrate no more than an ambivalent understanding, in constantly pressuring federal authorities to increase the head count to the point where over-grazing produces erosion and weed dominance. Likewise, the oceans of the world continue to suffer from the survival of the philosophy of the commons. Maritime nations still respond automatically to the shibboleth of the "freedom of the seas." Professing to believe in the "inexhaustible resources of the oceans," they bring species after species of fish and whales closer to extinction(9).

The National Parks present another instance of the working out of the tragedy of the commons. At present, they are open to all, without limit. The values that visitors seek in the park are steadily eroded. Plainly, we must soon cease to treat the parks as a commons or they will be of no value to anyone.

What shall we do? We have several options. We might sell them off as private property. We might keep them as public property, but allocate the right to enter them. The allocation might be on the basis of wealth, by the use of an auction system. It might be on the basis of merit, as defined by some agreed-upon standards. It might be by lottery. Or it might be on a first-come, first-served basis, administered to long queues. These, I think, are all the reasonable possibilities. They are all objectionable. But we must choose - or acquiesce in the destruction of the commons that we call our National Parks.

POLLUTION

In a reverse way, the tragedy of the commons reappears in problems of pollution. Here it is not a question of taking something out of the commons, but of putting something in- sewage, or chemical, radioactive, and heat wastes into water; noxious and dangerous fumes into the air; and distracting and unpleasant advertising signs into the line of sight. The calculations of utility are much the same as before. The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of "fouling our own nest," so long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers.

"The pollution problem is a consequence of population"

The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by private property, or something formally like it. But the air and waters surrounding us cannot readily be fenced, and so the tragedy of the commons as a cesspool must be prevented by different means, by coercive laws or taxing devices that make it cheaper for the polluter to treat his pollutants than to discharge them untreated. We have not progressed as far with the solution of this problem as we have with the first. Indeed, our particular concept of private property, which deters us from exhausting the positive resources of the earth, favors pollution. The owner of a factory on the bank of a stream - whose property extends to the middle of the stream often has difficulty seeing why it is not his natural right to muddy the waters flowing past his door. The law, always behind times, requires elaborate stitching and fitting to adapt it to this newly perceived aspect of the commons.

The pollution problem is a consequence of population. It did not much matter how a lonely American frontiersman disposed of his waste. "Flowing water purifies itself every 10 miles," my grandfather used to say, and the myth was near enough to the truth when he was a boy, for there were not too many people. But as population became denser, the natural chemical and biological recycling processes became overloaded, calling for a redefinition of property rights.

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HOW TO LEGISLATE TEMPERANCE ?

Analysis of the pollution problem as a function of population density uncovers a not generally recognized principle of morality, namely: the morality of an act is a function of the state of the system at the time it is performed (10). Using the commons as a cesspool does not harm the general public under frontier conditions, because there is no public; the same behavior in a metropolis is unbearable. A hundred and fifty years ago a plainsman could kill an American bison, cut out only the tongue for his dinner, and discard the rest of the animal. He was not in any important sense being wasteful. Today, with only a few bison left, we would be appalled at such behavior.

In passing, it is worth noting that the morality of an act cannot be determined from a photograph. One does not know whether a man killing an elephant or setting fire to the grassland is harming others until he knows the total system in which his act appears. "One picture is worth a thousand words," said an ancient Chinese; but it may take 10,000 words to validate it. It is as tempting to ecologists as it is to reformers in general to try to persuade others by way of the photographic shortcut. But the essence of an argument cannot be photographed: it must be presented rationally - in words.

That morality is system-sensitive escaped the attention of most codifiers of ethics in the past. "Thou shalt not..." is the form of traditional ethical directives which make no allowance for particular circumstances. The laws of our society follow the pattern of ancient ethics, and therefore are poorly suited to governing a complex, crowded, changeable world. Our epicyclic solution is to augment statutory law with administrative law. Since it is practically impossible to spell out all the conditions under which it is safe to burn trash in the back yard or to run an automobile without smogcontrol, by law we delegate the details to bureaus. The result is administrative law, which is rightly feared for an ancient reason- *Quis custodies ipsos custodes?* - "Who shall watch the watchers themselves?" John Adams said that we must have "a government of laws and not men." Bureau administrators, trying to evaluate the morality of acts in the total system, are singularly liable to corruption, producing a government by men, not laws.

Prohibition is easy to legislate (though not necessarily to enforce); but how do we legislate temperance? Experience indicates that it can be accomplished best through the mediation of administrative law. We limit possibilities unnecessarily if we suppose that the sentiment of *Quis custodiet* denies us the use of administrative law. We should rather retain the phrase as a perpetual reminder of fearful dangers we cannot avoid. The great challenge facing us now is to invent the corrective feedbacks that are needed to keep custodians honest. We must find ways to legitimate the needed authority of both the custodians and the corrective feedbacks.

FREEDOM TO BREED IS INTOLERABLE

The tragedy of the commons is involved in population problems in another way. In a world governed solely by the principle of "dog eat dog" - if indeed there ever was such a world - how many children a family had would not be a matter of public concern. Parents who bred too exuberantly would leave fewer descendants, not more, because they would be unable to care adequately for their children. David Lack and others have found that such a negative feedback demonstrably controls the fecundity of birds(II). But men are not birds, and have not acted like them for millenniums, at least.

If each human family were dependent only on its own resources; **if** the children of improvident parents starved to death; **if**, thus, overbreeding brought its own "punishment" to the germ line - **then** there would be no public interest in controlling the breeding of families. But our society is deeply committed to the welfare state(12), and hence is confronted with another aspect of the tragedy of the commons.

In a welfare state, how shall we deal with the family, the religion, the race, or the class (or indeed any distinguishable and cohesive group) that adopts overbreeding as a policy to secure its own aggrandizement(13)? To couple the concept of freedom to breed with the belief that everyone born has an equal right to the commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of action.

Unfortunately this is just the course of action that is being pursued by the United Nations. In late 1967, some 30 nations agreed to the following(14):

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes the family as the natural and fundamental unit of society. It follows that any choice and decision with regard to the size of the family must irrevocably rest with the family itself, and cannot be made by anyone else.

It is painful to have to deny categorically the validity of this right; denying it, one feels as uncomfortable as a resident of Salem, Massachusetts, who denied the reality of witches in the 17th century. At the present

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time, in liberal quarters, something like a taboo acts to inhibit criticism of the United Nations. There is a feeling that the United Nations is "our last and best hope," that we shouldn't find fault with it; we shouldn't play into the hands of the archconservatives. However, let us not forget what Robert Louis Stevenson said: "The truth that is suppressed by friends is the readiest weapon of the enemy." If we love the truth we must openly deny the validity of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, even though it is promoted by the United Nations. We should also join with Kingsley Davis(15) in attempting to get Planned Parenthood-World Population to see the error of its ways in embracing the same tragic ideal.

CONSCIENCE IS SELF-ELIMINATING

It is a mistake to think that we can control the breeding of mankind in the long run by an appeal to conscience. Charles Galton Darwin made this point when he spoke on the centennial of the publication of his grandfather's great book. The argument is straightforward and Darwinian.

People vary. Confronted with appeals to limited breeding, some people will undoubtedly respond to the plea more than others. Those who have more children will produce a larger fraction of the next generation that those with more susceptible consciences. The difference will be accentuated, generation by generation.

In C. G. Darwin's words: "It may well be that it would take hundreds of generations for the progenitive instinct to develop in this way, but if it should do so, nature would have taken her revenge, and the variety *Homo contracipiens* would become extinct and would be replaced by the variety *Homo progenitivus*"(16) .

The argument assumes that conscience or the desire for children (no matter which) is hereditary - but hereditary only in the most general formal sense. The result will be the same whether the attitude is transmitted through germ cells, or exosomatically, to use A. J. Lotka's term. (If one denies the latter possibility as well as the former, then what's the point of education?) The argument here has been stated in the context of the population problem, but it applies equally well to any instance in which society appeals to an individual exploiting a commons to restrain himself for the general good - by means of his conscience. To make such an appeal is to set up a selective system that works toward the elimination of conscience from the race.

PATHOGENIC EFFECTS OP CONSCIENCE

The long-term effects of conscience should be enough to condemn it; but serious short-term disadvantages as well. If we ask a man who is exploiting a commons to desist "in the name of conscience," what are we saying to him? What does he hear? - not only at the moment but also in the wee hours of the night when, half asleep, he remembers not merely the words we used but also the nonverbal communication cues we gave him unawares? Sooner or later, consciously or subconsciously, he senses that he has received two communications, and that they are contradictory: (i) (intended communication) "If you don't do as we ask, we will openly condemn you for not acting like a responsible citizen"; (ii) (the unintended communication) "If you do behave as we ask, we will secretly condemn you for a simpleton who can be shamed into standing aside while the rest of us exploit the commons."

Everyman then is caught in what Bateson has called a "double bind." Bateson and his co-workers have made a plausible case for viewing the double bind as an important causative factor in the genesis of schizophrenia(17). The double bind may not always be so damaging, but it always endangers the mental health of anyone to whom it is applied. "A bad conscience," said Nietzsche, "is a kind of illness."

To conjure up a conscience in others is tempting to anyone who wishes to extend his control beyond the legal limits. Leaders at the highest level succumb to this temptation. Has any President during the past generation failed to call on labor unions to moderate voluntarily their demands for higher wages, or to steel companies to honor voluntary guidelines on prices? I can recall none. The rhetoric used on such occasions is designed to produce feelings of guilt in noncooperators.

For centuries it was assumed without proof that guilt was a valuable, perhaps even an indispensable, ingredient of civilized life. Now, in this post-Freudian world, we doubt it.

Paul Goodman speaks from the modern point of view when he says: "No good has ever come from feeling guilty, neither intelligence, policy, nor compassion. The guilty do not pay attention to the object but only to themselves, and not even to their own interests, which might make sense, but to their anxieties."(18).

One does not have to be a professional psychiatrist to see the consequences of anxiety. We in the Western World are just emerging from a dreadful two-centuries-long Dark Ages of Eros that was sustained partly by

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prohibition laws, but perhaps more effectively by the anxiety-generating mechanisms of education. Alex Comfort has told the story well in *The Anxiety Makers*(19); it is not a pretty one.

Since proof is difficult, we may even concede that the results of anxiety may sometimes, from certain points of view, be desirable. The larger question we should ask is whether, as a matter of policy, we should ever encourage the use of a technique the tendency (if not the intention) of which is psychologically pathogenic. We hear much talk these days of responsible parenthood: the coupled words are incorporated into the titles of some organizations devoted to birth control. Some people have proposed massive propaganda campaigns to instill responsibility into the nation's (or the world's) breeders. But what is the meaning of the word responsibility in this context? Is it not merely a synonym for the word conscience? When we use the word responsibility in the absence of substantial sanctions are we not trying to browbeat a free man in a commons into acting against his own interest? Responsibility is a verbal counterfeit for a substantial *quid pro quo*. It is an attempt to get something for nothing.

If the word responsibility is to be used at all, I suggest that it be in the sense Charles Frankel uses it(20). "Responsibility," says this philosopher, "is the product of definite social arrangements." Notice that Frankel calls for social arrangements - not propaganda.

MUTUAL COERCION MUTUALLY AGREED UPON

The social arrangements that produce responsibility are arrangements that create coercion, of some sort. Consider bank-robbing. The man who takes money from a bank acts as if the bank were a commons. How do we prevent such action? Certainly not by trying to control his behavior solely by a verbal appeal to his sense of responsibility. Rather than rely on propaganda we follow Frankel's lead and insist that a bank is not a commons; we seek the definite social arrangements that will keep it from becoming a commons. That we will thereby infringe on the freedom of would-be robbers we neither deny nor regret.

The morality of bank-robbing is particularly easy to understand because we accept complete prohibition of this activity. We are willing to say, "Thou shalt not rob banks," without providing for exceptions. But temperance also can be created by coercion. Taxing is a good coercive device. To keep downtown shoppers temperate in their use of parking space we introduce parking meters for short periods, and traffic fines for longer ones. We need not actually forbid a citizen to park as long as he wants to; we need merely to make it increasingly expensive for him to do so. Not prohibition, but carefully biased options are what we offer him. A Madison Avenue man might call this persuasion; I prefer the greater candor of the word coercion.

Coercion is a dirty word to most liberals now, but it need not forever be so. As with the four-letter words, its dirtiness can be cleansed away by exposure to the light, by saying it over and over without apology or embarrassment. To many, the word coercion implies arbitrary decisions of distant and irresponsible bureaucrats; but this is not a necessary part of its meaning. The only kind of coercion I recommend is mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected.

To say that we mutually agree to coercion is not to say that we are required to enjoy it, or even to pretend we enjoy it. Who enjoys taxes? We all grumble about them. But we accept compulsory taxes because we recognize that voluntary taxes would favor the conscienceless. We institute and (grumblingly) support taxes and other coercive devices to escape the horrors of the commons.

"The social arrangements that produce responsibility are arrangements that create coercion, of some sort."

An alternative to the commons need not be perfectly just to be preferable. With real estate and other material goods, the alternative we have chosen is the institution of private property coupled with legal inheritance. Is this system perfectly just? As a genetically trained biologist I deny that it is. It seems to me that, if there are to be differences in individual inheritance, legal possession should be perfectly correlated with biological inheritance - that those who are biologically more fit to be the custodians of property and power should legally inherit more. But genetic recombination continually makes a mockery of the doctrine of "like father, like son" implicit in our laws of legal inheritance. An idiot can inherit millions, and a trust fund can keep his estate intact. We must admit that our legal system of private property plus inheritance is unjust - but we put up with it because we are not convinced, at the moment, that anyone has invented a better system. The alternative of the commons is too horrifying to contemplate. Injustice

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is preferable to total ruin.

It is one of the peculiarities of the warfare between reform and the status quo that it is thoughtlessly governed by a double standard. Whenever a reform measure is proposed it is often defeated when its opponents triumphantly discover a flaw in it. As Kingsley Davis has pointed out(21), worshipers of the status quo sometimes imply that no reform is possible without unanimous agreement, an implication contrary to historical fact. As nearly as I can make out, automatic rejection of proposed reforms is based on one of two unconscious assumptions: (i) that the status quo is perfect; or (ii) that the choice we face is between reform and no action; if the proposed reform is imperfect, we presumably should take no action at all, while we wait for a perfect proposal.

But we can never do nothing. That which we have done for thousands of years is also action. It also produces evils. Once we are aware that the status quo is action, we can then compare its discoverable advantages and disadvantages with the predicted advantages and disadvantages of the proposed reform, discounting as best we can for the lack of experience. On the basis of such a comparison, we can make a rational decision which will not involve the unworkable assumption that only perfect systems are tolerable.

RECOGNITION OF NECESSITY

Perhaps the simplest summary of this analysis of man's population problems is this: the commons, if justifiable at all, is justifiable only under conditions of low-population density. As the human population has increased, the commons has had to be abandoned in one aspect after another.

First we abandoned the commons in food gathering, enclosing farm land and restricting pastures and hunting and fishing areas. These restrictions are still not complete throughout the world.

Somewhat later we saw that the commons as a place for waste disposal would have to be abandoned. Restrictions on the disposal of domestic sewage are widely accepted in the Western World; we are still struggling to close the commons to pollution by automobiles, factories, insecticide sprayers, fertilizing operations, and atomic energy installations.

In a still more embryonic state is our recognition of the evils of the commons in matters of pleasure. There is almost no restriction on the propagation of sound waves in the public medium. The shopping public is assaulted with mindless music, without its consent. Our government is paying out billions of dollars to create supersonic transport which will disturb 50,000 people for every one person who is whisked from coast to coast 3 hours faster. Advertisers muddy the airwaves of radio and television and pollute the view of travelers. We are a long way from outlawing the commons in matters of pleasure. Is this because our Puritan inheritance makes us view pleasure as something of a sin, and pain (that is, the pollution of advertising) as the sign of virtue?

Every new enclosure of the commons involves the infringement of somebody's personal liberty. Infringements made in the distant past are accepted because no contemporary complains of a loss. It is the newly proposed infringements that we vigorously oppose; cries of "rights" and "freedom" fill the air. But what does "freedom" mean? When men mutually agreed to pass laws against robbing, mankind became more free, not less so. Individuals locked into the logic of the commons are free only to bring on universal ruin; once they see the necessity of mutual coercion, they become free to pursue other goals. I believe it was Hegel who said, "Freedom is the recognition of necessity."

The most important aspect of necessity that we must now recognize, is the necessity of abandoning the commons in breeding. No technical solution can rescue us from the misery of overpopulation. Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all. At the moment, to avoid hard decisions many of us are tempted to propagandize for conscience and responsible parenthood. The temptation must be resisted, because an appeal to independently acting consciences selects for the disappearance of all conscience in the long run, and an increase in anxiety in the short.

The only way we can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms is by relinquishing the freedom to breed, and that very soon. "Freedom is the recognition of necessity" - and it is the role of education to reveal to all the necessity of abandoning the freedom to breed. Only so, can we put an end to this aspect of the tragedy of the commons.

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PEANUTS CHARLES M. SCHULZ
HERE'S THE WORLD FAMOUS CENSUS TAKER GOING HOME AT THE END OF THE DAY...
I THINK I DID A PRETTY GOOD JOB
I COUNTED TEN PEOPLE
IF THERE ARE ANY MORE THAN THAT IN THE WORLD, I DON'T WANT TO HEAR ABOUT 'EM!
4-5
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SCHULZ

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Concerning balancing rights and responsibilities, the academic community has been increasingly troubled about pressures to amend curricula to reflect the needs of various groups for information about their cultures, and how to balance this with respect for the sources of Western culture. The curriculum report to the New York State Board of Regents has proved to be a particularly strong catalyst for disscussions in this area. Arthur Schlesinger is the Albert Schweitzer Professor of Humanities at the City University of New York. An eminent historian and government servant, Professor Schlesinger is the winner of Pulitzer Prizes in both history and biography. This aritcle is reprinted from THE WALL STREET JOURNAL *with his permission.*

AGAINST ACADEMIC APARTHEID

by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.

"What then is the American, this new man?" a French immigrant asked two centuries ago. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur gave the classic answer to his own question. "He is an American, who, leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new government he obeys, and the new rank he holds...Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of man."

The conception of America as a transforming nation, banishing old identities and creating a new one, prevailed through most of American history. It was famously reformulated by Israel Zangwill, an English writer of Russian-Jewish origin, when he called America "God's crucible, the great melting pot where all the races of Europe are melting and reforming." Most people who came to America expected to become Americans. They wanted to escape a horrid past and to embrace a hopeful future. Their goals were deliverance and assimilation.

Thus Crevecoeur wrote his "Letters from an American Farmer" in his acquired English, not in his native French. Thus immigrants reared in other tongues urged their children to learn English as speedily as possible. German immigrants tried for a moment to gain status for their language, but the effort got nowhere. The dominant culture was Anglo-Saxon and, with modification and enrichment, remained Anglo-Saxon.

REPUDIATION OF THE MELTING POT

The melting pot was one of those metaphors that turned out only to be partly true, and recent years have seen an astonishing repudiation of the whole conception. Many Americans today righteously reject the historic goal of "a new race of man." The contemporary ideal is not assimilation but ethnicity. The escape from origins has given way to a search for "roots." "Ancient prejudices and manners" - the old-time religion, the old-time diet - have made a surprising comeback.

These developments portend a new turn in American life. Instead of a transformative nation with a new and distinct identity. America increasingly sees itself as preservative of old identities. We used to say e pluribus unum. Now we glorify pluribus and belittle unum. The melting pot yields to the Tower of Babel.

"We used to say e pluribus unum. Now we glorify pluribus and belittle unum."

The new turn has had marked impact on the universities. Very little agitates academia more these days than the demands of passionate minorities for revision of the curriculum: in history, the denunciation of Western civilization courses as cultural imperialism; in literature the denunciation of the "canon," the list of essential books, as an instrumentality of the existing power structure.

A recent report by the New York State Commissioner of Education's task force on "Minorities: Equity and Excellence" luridly describes "African Americans, Asian Americans, Puerto Ricans/Latinos and Native Americans" as "victims of an intellectual and educational oppression." The "systematic bias toward European culture and its derivatives," the report claims, has "a terribly damaging effect on the psyche of young

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people of African, Asian, Latino and Native American descent" - a doubtful assertion for which no proof is vouchsafed.

Of course teachers of history and literature should give due recognition to women, black Americans, Indians, Hispanics and other groups who were subordinated and ignored in the high noon of male Anglo-Saxon dominance. In recent years they have begun belatedly to do so. But the cult of ethnicity, pressed too far, exacts costs -- as, for example, the current pressure to teach history and literature not as intellectual challenges but as psychological therapy.

There is nothing new, of course, about the yearnings of excluded groups for affirmations of their own historical and cultural dignity. When Irish-Americans were thought beyond the pale, their spokesmen responded much as spokesmen for blacks, Hispanics and others respond today. Professor John V. Kelleher, for many years Harvard's distinguished Irish scholar, once recalled his first exposure to Irish-American history - "turgid little essays on the fact that the Continental Army was 75% Irish, or that many of George Washington's closest friends were nuns and priests, or that Lincoln got the major ideas for the Second Inaugural Address from the Hon. Francis P. Mageghegan of Alpaca, New York, a pioneer manufacturer of cast-iron rosary beads." John Kelleher called this "the there's-always-an-Irishman-at-the-bottom-of-it-doing-the-real-work approach to American history."

Fortunately most Irish-Americans disregarded their spokesmen and absorbed the American tradition. About 1930, Kelleher said, those"turgid little essays began to vanish from Irish-American papers." He added: "I wonder whose is the major component in the Continental Army these days?" The answer, one fears, is getting to be blacks, Jews and Hispanics.

There is often artificiality about the attempts to use history to minister to psychological needs. When I encounter black insistence on inserting Africa into mainstream curricula, I recall the 1956 presidential campaign. Adlai Stevenson, for whom I was working, had a weak record on civil rights in America but was a champion of African nationalism. I suggested to a group of sympathetic black leaders that maybe if Stevenson talked to black audiences about Africa, he could make up for his deficiencies on civil rights. My friends laughed and said that American blacks couldn't care less about Africa. That is no longer the case; but one can't escape the feeling that present emotions are more manufactured than organic.

Let us by all means teach women's history, black history, Hispanic history. But let us teach them as history, not as a means of promoting group self-esteem. I don't often agree with Gore Vidal, but I liked his remark the other day: "What I hate is good citizenship history. That has wrecked every history book. Now we're getting 'The Hispanics are warm and joyous and have brought such wonder into our lives,' you know, and before them the Jews, and before them the blacks. And the women, I mean, cut it out!"

Novelists, moralists, politicians, fabulators can go beyond the historical evidence to tell inspiring stories. But historians are custodians of professional standards. Their objective is critical analysis, accuracy and objectivity, not making people feel better about themselves.

"Let us by all means teach women's history, black history, Hispanic history. But let us teach them as history, not as a means of promoting group self-esteem."

Heaven knows how dismally historians fall short of their ideals; how sadly our interpretations are dominated and distorted by unconscious preconceptions; how obsessions of race and nation blind us to our own bias. All historians may in one way or another mythologize history. But the answer to bad history is not "good citizenship history" - more bad history written from a different viewpoint. The answer to bad history is better history.

The ideological assault in English departments on the "canon" as an instrument of political oppression implies the existence of a monolithic body of work designed to enforce the "hegemony" of a class or race or sex. In fact, most great literature and much good history are deeply subversive in their impact on orthodoxies. Consider the American canon: Emerson, Whitman, Melville, Hawthorne, Thoreau, Mark Twain, Henry Adams, William and Henry James, Holmes, Dreiser, Faulkner. Lackeys of the ruling class? Agents of American imperialism?

Let us by all means learn about other continents and other cultures. But, lamentable as some may think it, we inherit an American experience, as America inherits a European experience. To deny the essentially European origins of American culture is to falsify history.

We should take pride in our distinctive inheritance

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as other nations take pride in their distinctive inheritances. Certainly there is no need for Western civilization, the source of the ideas of individual freedom and political democracy to which most of the world now aspires, to apologize to cultures based on despotism, superstition, tribalism and fanaticism. Let us abjure what Bertrand Russell called the fallacy of "the superior virtue of the oppressed."

Of course we must teach the Western democratic tradition in its true proportions - not as a fixed, final and complacent orthodoxy, intolerant of deviation and dissent, but as an ever-evolving creed fulfilling its ideals through debate, self-criticism, protest, disrespect and irreverence, a tradition in which all groups have rights of heterodoxy and opportunities for self-assertion. It is a tradition that has empowered people of all nations and races. Little can have a more "terribly damaging effect on the psyche" than for educators to tell young blacks and Hispanics and Asians that it is not for them.

ONE STEP AT A TIME

Belief in one's own culture does not mean disdain for other cultures. But one step at a time: No culture can hope to ingest other cultures all at once, certainly not before it ingests its own. After we have mastered our own culture, we can explore the world.

If we repudiate the quite marvelous inheritance that history has bestowed on us, we invite the fragmentation of our own culture into a quarrelsome spatter of enclaves, ghettos and tribes. The bonds of cohesion in our society are sufficiently fragile, or so it seems to me, that it makes no sense to strain them by encouraging and exalting cultural and linguistic apartheid. The rejection of the melting pot points the republic in the direction of incoherence and chaos.

In the 21st century, if present trends hold, non-whites in the U.S. will begin to outnumber whites. This will bring inevitable changes in the national ethos but not, one must hope, at the expense of national cohesion. Let the new Americans forswear the cult of ghettoization and agree with Crevecoeur, as with most immigrants in the two centuries since, that in America "individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of man."

SLICING IT THIN

Our earth and its resources are limited, yet our world populations continue to increase, and to use the earth's space and its resources.

Consider that an apple represents the earth. Slice the apple into quarters. Set three quarters aside, which represent the oceans of the world. The remaining fourth quarter represents the earth's land area.

Slice this "land" in half and set aside one of the pieces representing the land area that is inhospitable to people, such as polar areas, swamps, deserts, high or rocky mountains.

The remaining one-eighth piece is land where people live. Cut this piece into four sections, and set 3/32 aside. This is the land that contains cities, suburban sprawl, highways, shopping centers, schools, parks, factories, parking lots, and other places where people live and work but where food cannot grow .

Carefully peel the remaining 1/32 slice of earth. This tiny, fragile peel represents the very thin surface of the earth's crust upon which humans depend for growing crops.

Good topsoil, a most valuable resource, is often only a few inches thick, and one windstorm or rainstorm can easily remove what nature took 100 years to build.

Wise use of the land and soil conservation are essential to everyone.

Written by Barbara Nichols and reprinted with permission from Michigan Natural Resources, a publication of the Department of Natural Resources of the State of Michigan.

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The rapid influx of immigrants by means of both legal ad illegal immigration has brought with it the dilemmas of assimilation: parents who want their children to become culturally American facing off against school officials intent on maintaining the culture of origin; the inclusion of recent immigrants in affirmative action programs designed to redress wrongs that did not involve them; disputes over the role of language in maintaining culture vs the need for a common tongue; and so on.

The following article is a valuable reminder for Americans of the political and cultural contexts in which assimilations takes place. Ira Mehlman, who has lived and worked in Israel, is currently Director of Research and Publication for FAIR, the Federation for American Immigration Reform. This monograph was originally published by the 21st Century Fund.

ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES: A COMMON PROBLEM OF ASSIMILATING IMMIGRANTS

by Ira H. Mehlman

Parts of the United States are currently undergoing a radical demographic and cultural transformation rarely experienced in the annals of human history. Demographers have documented that, as a result of large-scale immigration, California - the country's most populous state - will be composed of a majority of minorities by the first decade of the next century. Moreover, unlike the waves of immigration that transformed the major urban areas of the East Coast and Midwest in the early part of this century, the immigrants flooding into California do not share a common European heritage with the more established population.

Such dramatic demographic and cultural changes will undoubtedly produce, even under the best of circumstances, profound social changes. If current patterns persist, in which large numbers of Latin American and Southeast Asian immigrants continue to lag well behind the Anglo population educationally and economically, the changes are likely to cause severe stress on the social fabric of California and other parts of the country undergoing similar transformations.

As is the nature of social science, demographers and sociologists and immigration reform advocates are searching for some historical precedent to which they can compare the social changes now occurring in California. Because the Anglo population will shortly cease to be the majority in California and is unlikely to relinquish control of the state's economic infrastructure, some have warned that a form of American apartheid will develop. The white minority in South Africa controls most of the wealth and the economic infrastructure of the country. Whites enjoy better housing, education and a significantly higher standard of living than does the nonwhite majority. The same is likely to be true of California's Anglo minority whose standard of living will remain well above that of the black, Hispanic and (some of the) Asian population, who, combined, will constitute the majority.

That, however, is about as far as the comparison legitimately goes. South Africa is a police state in which the majority population is afforded very few civil rights and virtually no political power. Apartheid, as political philosophy, advocates the continued separation of races and cultures. It is not the objective of the apartheid regime to assimilate the various cultures in South Africa into a single cohesive unit.

California (and the United States) is a democracy. The civil rights of all segments of the population are guaranteed (if not always perfectly enforced) and every citizen has the right to vote. Minorities can, and do, wield political power in California and throughout the country. Furthermore, the societal objective of the United States (and by extension California) is the incorporation of all elements of society into a cohesive, unified entity. We may not have succeeded in achieving this goal, but clearly, the motives of the two societies are

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as different as night and day.

Apartheid is an insidious political philosophy unique to South Africa. Despite some superficial similarities with that system, drawing comparisons between American pluralism and apartheid is more than just inaccurate - it's slanderous. To make legitimate comparisons we must choose a society that is similar to our own in political philosophy and societal objectives.

Israel may offer us a valid comparison. The similarities between what is currently happening in California and what has already occurred in Israel, are striking. Israel is both a democracy and a nation that has been radically transformed (in a relatively short period of time) by immigration. The State of Israel was founded by Jews from Europe, who were Western in their culture and orientation. European Jews, as a result of large-scale immigration and higher birth rates, were subsequently supplanted as the majority by Jews from North Africa and the Middle East whose culture and orientation were significantly different. Like the United States, Israel's objective is to assimilate these immigrant groups into the political and economic mainstream. And, like the United States, their success has been marginal at best. An examination of Israel's affluent Ashkenazic minority and poorer Sephardic minority may provide a valid comparison for what is likely to occur in California and other regions of the United States.

(For the purposes of this essay, Ashkenazic Jew will be used as a generic term for Jews of European or North American ancestry. The term Sephardic Jew, though technically including Jews of Southern European heritage, will be used only to mean Jews who trace their ancestry to the Moslem nations of North Africa and the Middle East. In looking at many of the social pathologies common to our two societies, it would not be entirely invalid to substitute Anglo for Ashkenazic and Hispanic for Sephardic. In fact, Sephardic is a derivative of the Hebrew name for Spain.)

CHANGING DEMOGRAPHY AND CULTURE

Israel was conceived, founded and settled by European Jews - identical in culture and origin to most American Jews. The founders of Israel, like their American Jewish counterparts of that era, were dedicated to the same humanist, secular values that helped spawn the labor movement and the American left. People like David Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir, Mosha Sharrett and Levi Eshkol were not merely Zionists - they were dedicated socialists who were as intent on creating a democratic socialist state as they were a Jewish state. In addition, they were decidedly secular, even anti-religious in their outlook. These were the principles and ideals on which Israel was founded (and which have been undeservedly romanticized).

As is universally true, those who arrive someplace first establish the societal and economic rules which, of course, favor themselves. Israel was certainly no exception. Having settled in Palestine first, Ashkenazic Jews claimed the best land, created the economic infrastructure and created a political system designed to protect those interests. After the establishment of the state in 1948, there was massive migration of Jews from North Africa and the Middle East (both voluntary and through expulsion) to Israel. By 1961, as many Jews had immigrated to Israel as had lived there prior to 1948. The vast majority of the immigrants were Sephardim. (Though Ashkenazim make up more than 80 percent of world Jewry, most either couldn't or didn't want to emigrate to Israel.) By about 1965, as a result of immigration and higher birth rates, Sephardim became the majority population of Israel.

The cultural orientation of this emerging majority is much different than that of Ashkenazic Jews. While Ashkenazic Jews were influenced by (and had an influence on) the liberal movements of Europe and America, the Sephardim were very much a product of the Islamic cultures in which they had lived for centuries. Their attitudes about work, education, family, the role of women, etc. are very similar to attitudes found in Moslem countries and not all that much different from Hispanic attitudes about these institutions. Moreover, beyond the concept of a Jewish state, Sephardim do not share the founding Ashkenazic dedication to a political philosophy. To the Ashkenazic founders, humanist values were as important as the Zionist values. To the Sephardim, Zionist nationalism is, and continues to be, the primary concern.

ATTITUDES TOWARD SEPHARDIM

Like Hispanics in California, Sephardim in Israel are guaranteed equal protection under the law and the right to vote is not only guaranteed, it is actively encouraged. Also, like Hispanics in California (and elsewhere in the U.S.), the Sephardim have always been subject to a subtle form of discrimination. From the time the early Sephardic immigrants arrived in Israel - and were sprayed with DDT for fear they carried lice and other vermin - they were made to feel that their culture was inferior. While, perhaps, it cannot be characterized as outright racism, the

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attitudes of the Ashkenazim toward the Sephardim is very similar to the attitudes of Anglos toward Hispanics. Paternalism, condescension or patronization, might more accurately describe the attitudes of Ashkenazim or Anglos. Whatever the correct term, and however subtly it is expressed, such attitudes do not go unnoticed or unresented by either Sephardim or Hispanics. Thus, the natural human reaction is to reject the culture and the values of those you perceive are scorning you. Consequently, significant social rifts persist and longstanding bitterness continues to fester between Sephardim and Ashkenazim as it does between Hispanics and Anglos.

Israeli novelist/journalist Amos Oz (who is Ashkenazic and one of the leading voices of the Israeli left) recounts some of the hostility and deep-seated resentment of the Sephardim toward the Ashkenazim in his book, *In the Land of Israel*. Sitting in a cafe in the predominantly Sephardic development town of Bet Shemesh, Oz, who is a well-known public figure in Israel, recorded some of the comments made to him by town residents: "My parents came from North Africa...So what? They had their dignity, didn't they? Their own values? Their own faith?...Why did you make fun of their beliefs? Why did they have to be disinfected with Lysol at the Haifa port?" In the words of another resident: "I'll tell you what the shame is: they gave us houses, they gave us dirty work; they gave us education and they took away our self-respect. What did they bring my parents to Israel for?...Wasn't it to do your dirty work?...If they give back the territories, the Arabs will stop coming to work, and then and there you'll put us back into the dead-end jobs, like before. If for no other reason we won't let you give back those territories...that's why we hate you."

"The similarities between what is currently happening in California and what has already occurred in Israel are striking."

Dr. Daniel J. Elazar, Director of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and the author of several books on the role of Sephardim in Israeli society, has done more scientific research on the attitudes of Israeli Sephardim and finds the emotional outbursts recorded by Oz to be more or less accurate. "Sephardim are still very angry at Ashkenazim," says Elazar. "I think they are more angry at them for cultural imperialism than they are for economic imperialism. The Ashkenazim told them, in effect, that 'you are culturally inferior to us,' therefore, to get ahead in our society you must become like us because your own ethnicity is not deserving of respect, consideration or equal treatment."

The feeling that one's culture is being denigrated retards the assimilation process, causing the scorned to turn inward and to resist the natural process of acculturation. These feelings are perceptively described by Richard Rodriguez, the son of Mexican immigrants to California, in his autobiographical book, *Hunger of Memory*: "Like others who have known the pain of public alienation, we transformed the knowledge of our public separateness and made it consoling - the reminder of intimacy." These sentiments are echoed by Richard Estrada, a Mexican-American columnist for the Dallas Morning News, who talks of the need and desire of Hispanic Americans to have their culture validated by the majority population. Without the psychic assurance that American society recognizes the positive aspects of their culture, many Hispanic-Americans find it difficult to embrace American culture.

With the passage of nearly 30 years since the end of massive immigration of Jews from Islamic countries, there is virtually universal agreement that the feeling of wounded pride on the part of the Sephardim is the single greatest obstacle to overcoming the social gaps that persist in Israel. Feelings of distrust and alienation, if allowed to persist over several generations, can develop into a culture of their own. Dr. Shlomo Elbaz, President of a left-wing Sephardic organization, "East for Peace", describes what he fears will become a social pathology among Israel's disadvantaged Sephardim. "They were treated as outsiders, they felt themselves as outsiders, and more than that they developed a psychological inferiority complex because of the superiority complex of the absorbers. That is the worst thing that could happen to a human group."

EDUCATION AND POVERTY

The Ashkenazic Jews of Israel, like their American counterparts, are of a culture that places a premium on education. The Sephardic culture, like the Hispanic culture, has traditionally placed less emphasis on education. Moreover, Israeli society, like American society, tends to reinforce this difference in the way it treats children from these cultures. In both cases, the societal attitude is that children from these cultures are predisposed to fail, and more often than not, it becomes a self-

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fulfilling prophecy.

Schools in Sephardic neighborhoods, like those in Hispanic neighborhoods, are demonstrably inferior. An Israeli Education Ministry study found that the top seventh graders in schools in Tel Aviv's mostly Sephardic Hatikvah section could not do third grade arithmetic. This is both a product of family life which does not emphasize the importance of education, and a school system that expects Sephardic youngsters to perform poorly. Consequently, most of these children are tracked away from academic high schools and toward vocational schools which, in the words of Israeli sociologist David Hartman, were set up "to keep them (Sephardic children) off the streets."

Though a greater effort is now being made to upgrade the quality of education for Sephardic youngsters, Dr. Elazar blames past failures on the cynical attitudes of the Zionist socialists who ruled the country until 1977. The ruling socialists "encouraged" immigrants from the "backwards" cultures of North Africa and the Middle East to pursue the socialist goal of working the land and building the country with Jewish manual labor while they were sending their own offspring to college to become white collar professionals. "The establishment was telling them, in a sense, to become hewers of wood and drawers of water. They were telling them that because in principle they wanted all Jews to do that but, of course, not their child," says Elazar.

In 1979 Sephardic children comprised 57.7 percent of the 14 to 17-year-old age group in Israel. However, they represented 64.3 percent of vocational school enrollment and 64.7 percent of agricultural school enrollment. Conversely, only 38.7 percent of children in academic high schools were Sephardim. Even worse, 70 percent of vocational high school graduates could not qualify for employment in the trades for which they were trained. The high school students in the 1979 survey are today's young adults who have now completed their military service, are starting families and entering the workforce.

Ten percent of Sephardic youngsters age 14 to 17 were neither in school nor working, compared with only 3.4 percent of Ashkenazic youth in the same age group. In some of the most depressed Sephardic areas, like the Hatikvah section of Tel Aviv, the high school dropout rate is more than 50 percent. All this translates into university enrollment that is 71.8 percent Ashkenazic and only 17.5 percent Sephardic. (The rest is Arab.) Among Israelis whose parents were born in Europe or America, 22.6 percent have 16 or more years of formal education compared to only four percent of those whose parents were born in Africa or Asia. In fact, according to Dr. Elazar, who is on the faculty of Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Arabs have proportionally greater representation on Israeli campuses than do Sephardim.

These same lopsided differences can be seen in comparisons of Anglo and Hispanic educational attainment in the United States. More than one-third of Hispanic-Americans have less than eight years of schooling compared with only 12 percent of whites. Conversely, while 20.5 percent of Anglo adults have completed four years of college, only 8.6 percent of Hispanics have four years of college to their credit.

As is the case with Hispanics in California, educational failure among Sephardim has contributed to a cycle of poverty. This is becoming increasingly true as the nations of the West move into the post-industrial period where high-skill white collar and technological jobs command rapidly-increasing salaries, while lower-skill industrial jobs are becoming less financially rewarding. A 1958 study conducted by Dr. Ya'acov Nahon of The Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies found that for each self-employed white collar Ashkenazi professional, there were only 38 such Sephardim. Among those white collar workers drawing a salary, there were only 40 Sephardim for every 100 Ashkenazim. Thus, it is not surprising to find that the income gap between second generation Sephardim and the second generation Ashkenazim is greater than that of their parents - and the gap continues to grow. Official Israeli government statistics show that in 1985 Jews of African-Asian heritage earned only 80.7 percent as much as the average Israeli of European or American descent. Moreover, because Sephardim tend to have larger families, that smaller income supported an additional 1.1 persons per household. In the United States, the income discrepancy between Anglos and Hispanics is even greater: In 1987, the median Hispanic income was only 65 percent of the median for Anglos. Consequently, 27.3 percent of Hispanics live below the official poverty level compared with only 11 percent of whites.

SOCIAL BREAKDOWN

Like their Hispanic counterparts in the United States, many Sephardic youngsters are caught between cultures. They have not acquired the skills to make it in Israeli society and they feel alienated by what they

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perceive as chauvinism on the part of Ashkenazim. However, they are also rejecting the traditional Sephardic culture of their parents as being anachronistic and irrelevant to their new world. This phenomenon is especially prevalent among the children of immigrants from Morocco, the largest and least successful of the Sephardic immigrant groups.

Like Hispanic culture, traditional Sephardic culture is highly paternalistic, a trait that was obviously functional throughout the centuries they lived in the Moslem world. However, that culture has not been adaptable to a Western-oriented society like Israel. Colonel Ami Gluska, an immigrant from Yemen, explains in a New York Times article that upon arrival in Israel, "the whole 'valued' system was smashed, the whole system which gave security - the father, the grandfather, who had such authority. The family, which had strict rules, the hierarchy in which everyone knew his place everything was blown to pieces because the father, who could not read or write Hebrew, couldn't communicate with the authorities. Suddenly the little children found they were more advanced and were explaining things to their father."

The Sephardic immigrants themselves, like most immigrants, were willing to settle for whatever scraps their adopted country threw them. They were aware that the Ashkenazim had more than they did, but life, in most cases, was still considerably better than it was in the countries from which they had emigrated. Their children, however, have been less reticent about making demands on their native country and more resentful of the differences between themselves and the Ashkenazim.

Daniel Shimshoni, who writes extensively about the social and political development of Israeli society, makes a cogent point about the dangers of rising expectations that go unfulfilled. His observations are relevant both with respect to the children of Sephardic immigrants to Israel and Latino immigrants to the United States. In his book *Israeli Democracy: The Middle of the Journey*, Shimshoni states that "while [the immigrants'] absolute standard of living rose...their relative status, for the most part, declined and they felt themselves to be at the bottom of the social ladder." Historically, the frustration of inflated expectations has produced profound consequences. In its more dramatic forms, frustrated expectations have led to the storming of the Bastille in 1789 and the near-revolution in China in 1989. In its less dramatic forms, it produces a social malaise of apathy, chronic poverty, drug and alcohol dependency and alienation which also serve to undermine the society it afflicts. When the latter condition begins to entrench itself, says Shimoni, "benefits are looked upon as rights and people rapidly become accustomed to the provision of their needs by a top-down administration."

"The lesson the United States can learn from the Israeli experience is caution."

While traditional Sephardic values of family, respect for authority and self-sufficiency were being undermined, young Sephardim have not adopted the Western values of the Ashkenazim. Like second-generation Hispanics in the United States, native-born Israeli Sephardim have rejected their ancestral cultures while remaining deeply suspicious and resentful of the dominant culture.

The *Encyclopedia Judaica*, in its article about Sephardic immigration to Israel, succinctly summarizes the experience of many of the immigrants: "The immigrants from Islamic countries...quickly became an economic, social and especially cultural proletariat in Israel. They felt uprooted in their new surrounding, where the dominant social focus demanded that they abandon their traditions and culture and assimilate unconditionally into modern Israeli society, which was basically Western...The prevailing public opinion in the country tended to regard the older generation of new immigrants from Islamic countries as a lost generation that would eventually die off, and their main concern was to help the younger generation throw off the burdens of its paternal-stoic traditions. Israeli society, however, was successful in many instances only in shattering the patriarchal family structure, which was the principal framework of the immigrants from Islamic countries, and thus destroying old values without simultaneously transferring its own value system as an integral part of the newcomers' personality. In effect, this resulted in the creation of a society that was socially displaced, living on the fringes of two cultures, and attracted to the glittering commercial aspects of modern materialistic culture."

In analyzing the social pathology that has developed among many Sephardic immigrants and their children, David K. Shipler, former New York Times correspon-

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dent in Israel, observed:..."Welfare programs have not prevented a cycle of poverty from evolving. It now limits the horizons of the children of the poor, dooming many to repeat their parents' unsuccessful struggle against the handicaps of inferior education, cramped and shoddy apartments, low-paying jobs and mean streets." Shipler could just as easily have been writing about the children of Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles as the children of Sephardic immigrants in Tel Aviv.

EMPLOYMENT AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

Among the most common arguments used by those in the United States who advocate maintaining or increasing the current high levels of immigration (600,000 legal immigrants per year and possibly an equal number of illegal immigrants) is the assertion that immigrants are required to do jobs that Americans are unwilling to do. Whether American workers are rejecting menial and back-breaking jobs, or simply rejecting the low wages many industries offer, is the subject of considerable debate. Nevertheless, the experience of Israel points up the danger of viewing immigrants as solutions to short-term goals instead of as people who have long-term needs and desires.

During the 1950's, the peak years of North African and Middle Eastern immigration, the Israeli government decided that it was in the national interest to populate the unsettled regions of the Galilee and the Negev. In an effort to meet those goals, the government "encouraged" new Sephardic immigrants to move to settlement towns in those regions. Today, many of the blue-collar industries that were established in those towns have been forced out of business by low-wage competition from the Third World. Half of Israel's unemployment today is among the ten percent of the population that lives in those development towns. Yesterday's solution to manpower and settlement needs has become Israel's enormous social problem of today. Similarly, many of the disenfranchised Hispanic youth in the United States are the children of immigrants this country "needed" to pick lettuce or sew collars on shirts.

Of those Sephardic immigrants who settled in Israel's urban centers, many found themselves in situations similar to those Hispanic immigrants now face in the United States. Like the Spanish-speaking barrios of many major American cities, Sephardic immigrants had limited social contact with the dominant culture with which they needed to interact. Because of how and where they settled, says Dr. Shimshoni, the immigrants were "suddenly placed by themselves in a new environment," where they had "no close neighbors from whom they could learn, or through whom they could integrate into the larger society, so that progress was slow" and problems persisted. The same ghetto problems that plague a growing
number of Hispanic youngsters - lack of access to the best schools and teachers, inadequate recreational facilities, isolation from the cultural enrichment of museums and concert halls - also afflict the children of Sephardic immigrants.

On the other hand, those Sephardic immigrants, like Hispanic immigrants, who settled outside the ethnic ghettos of the cities or isolated rural and development towns, have been far more successful in finding their niche in their adopted societies.

POLITICAL POWER

All the troubling social pathologies described to this point have already been felt in California and other parts of the United States. Where Israel is ahead of California is in the political impact of the new demographic order. Israel's Sephardim are at least two decades ahead of California's Hispanics in making their political clout felt.

Likud has held power in Israel for 10 out of the last 12 years (the exception being the two-year stint of Shimon Peres as Prime Minister under a rotating prime ministership arrangement) primarily because of the Sephardic vote.

For the first 29 years of its existence, Israel was ruled by the left-of-center Labor Alliance. (Labor is not one party but an alliance of parties, as is Likud.) Labor finally lost control of the government in 1977 for three primary reasons: 1) They had been caught off guard by the Yom Kippur War in 1973. 2) Socialism was no more successful in Israel than anywhere else it has been tried. 3) The Sephardim represented a majority of the voting-age population, and perceiving Labor as the party of the Ashkenazim, voted for Menachim Begin's Likud Alliance. Begin came to office in 1977 with just 25 percent of the Ashkenazic vote, but 57 percent of the Sephardic vote.

Whatever else one might think of Begin, he was a strong charismatic leader who was able to hold together a shaky coalition of right-of-center religious parties and implement some of his own political agenda. Since his retirement in 1983, however, the inadequacies of a divided electorate have become glaringly obvious. For

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the past six years Israel has had government by paralysis. Dr. Elazar in his 1989 book, *The Other Jews - The Sephardim Today*, asserts that "Israeli Menachim Begin's Likud bloc succeeded in breaking what had been a Labor monopoly on political power with the help of a huge Sephardic vote . . . . In 1984, over two-thirds of Sephardim voted Likud and more than two-thirds of Ashkenazim voted Labor".

Israeli politics has become a stalemate between the economic power of the Ashkenazim and the voting strength of the Sephardim. As one of the residents of Bet Shemesh pointed out to journalist Amos Oz: "To this day the real power is not in [Sephardic] hands. You've got the Histadrut (Israel's enormously powerful labor union) and you've got the newspapers and the big money, and you've also got the radio and TV. You're still running the country." These divergent interests seem to be pulling in opposite directions and, at least for the time being, they are cancelling each other out. The result is a government that cannot address its external problems, i.e., what to do with the West Bank and Gaza, nor can it effectively address its pressing domestic issues such as the failing economy. This standoff is due in part to the divergent interests of the wealthier Ashkenazic minority and the less affluent Sephardic majority. The result is that Israel is a country in limbo - and a country that cannot steer a steady course often finds itself adrift.

DIFFERENCES AS IMPORTANT AS SIMILARITIES

Perhaps more than the similarities, it is the differences that make the analogy between the Israeli assimilation problem and the American assimilation problem all the more compelling. The mere fact that Israel has had (and continues to have) an assimilation problem, should make any immigrant-receiving country sit up and take notice. Israel's difficulties in assimilating large numbers of non-Westerners into what is essentially a Western, post-industrial society, is convincing evidence that such processes are difficult and require a great deal of effort and understanding on the part of both the receiving society and the immigrants themselves. Despite their many differences, Sephardim and Ashkenazim share far more in common than do the current wave of immigrants and older population of the United States.

Despite nearly two millennia of diaspora, the ethnic and religious identity of the dispersed Jewish communities remained remarkably in tact. While the cultural and political development of the disparate Jewish communities of the world were strongly influenced by the societies in which they lived, all Jews maintained some powerful common bonds. There is a core of religious, social and ethical beliefs that are common to Sephardim and Ashkenazim despite thousands of years of separation. And though it was the Jews of Central and Eastern Europe who reestablished the Jewish state, the aspiration of returning to Zion was a powerful and recurring theme in the literature and liturgy of all segments of world Jewry.

Unlike the current wave of immigrants to the United States, the Sephardim faced no identity crisis upon arrival in Israel. The vast majority of immigrants to the United States come in the hope of improving their economic condition. They have strong cultural, ethnic and familial ties with the countries they leave behind. It will take several generations, at least, before they and their descendants cease to think of themselves as hyphenated Americans. Sephardic immigrants immediately identified themselves as Israelis. There were no lingering allegiances to the countries they left behind. For the most part, they had lived for centuries as outcasts in those societies - never as Moroccans or Iraqis or Yemenite, rather as Jews who happened to be living in those countries. Their allegiance to Israel was immediate and unequivocal, even to the point of the immigrants themselves adopting Hebrew as their spoken language. In their own estimation the Sephardim had not immigrated, rather they had returned home after a 1,900 year absence.

There are also important differences between how the Anglo population views the current wave of immigrants to the United States and how the more established Israeli population viewed the immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East. At best, Americans view immigrants with antipathy, at worst as unwelcome intruders. Their attitude of cultural superiority notwithstanding, the Ashkenazim recognized the Sephardim as an integral part of the nation they were attempting to reconstitute. No one ever questioned the right of the immigrants to settle in Israel.

Finally, Israel has had one additional (and very powerful) incentive for avoiding internal disunity. A country whose very survival is in constant and immediate peril can ill-afford deep social divisions. Yet, in spite of all the reasons Israel has had to achieve a rapid and amicable assimilation of its immigrants, the proc-

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ess has been slow and painful, and the ultimate objective still eludes that country. Israel is proof that even when all elements of a society want assimilation to take place and understand that the failure to do so is like playing Russian Roulette with their national existence, creating a harmonious synthesis of cultures is a monumental task.

CONCLUSIONS

The lesson the United States can learn from the Israeli experience is caution. We cannot absorb unlimited numbers of people who are culturally very different from ourselves and expect the assimilation process to go smoothly, no matter how noble our intentions are. Israel proves that even under the best of circumstances, assimilating people into a postindustrial, technological society can cause significant social friction. Unless we in the United States begin incorporating our large Third World immigrant population into the economic and cultural mainstream, we are asking for trouble down the road.

Though certainly not a perfect model, we ought to look very closely at the ongoing process of cultural assimilation in Israel. Other countries are being affected by immigration from societies whose cultures are radically different than their own. However, the United States and Israel are unique in that they view immigrants as Americans or Israelis - people who somehow have to be brought into the mainstream. In this respect we are different from countries like France and Germany which see their immigrants as alien populations living within their borders. It is certainly different from the way the government of South Africa views blacks and other racial and ethnic groups living in that country.

Israel meets all the criteria for a valid comparison. It is a political democracy; its founders were Western; the new majority did not create the political or economic infrastructure and yet, by virtue of being the majority, they have legitimate claims to make on the system; the cultural and economic gap between the more established population and the newer arrivals persists after several generations; and the stated goal of the society is to create a country based on Western values.

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Originally printed in the Kettering Review, this call to the re-building of a sense of community in the various segments of our American society is a much-needed antidote to present day fragmentation. John Gardner is presently the Miriam and Peter Haas Centennial Professor at Stanford Business School. He was Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare from 1965 to 1968 and is the author of the newly published book ON LEADERSHIP.

BUILDING COMMUNITY

by John W. Gardner

We know that where community exists it confers upon its members identity, a sense of belonging, and a measure of security. It is in communities that the attributes that distinguish humans as social creatures are nourished. Communities are the ground-level generators and preservers of values and ethical systems. The ideals of justice and compassion are nurtured in communities. The natural setting for religion is the religious community.

The breakdown of communities has had a serious disintegrating effect on the behavior of individuals. We have all observed the consequences in personal and social breakdown. The casualties stream through the juvenile courts and psychiatrists' offices and drug abuse clinics. There has been much talk of the breakup of the nuclear family as a support structure for children. We must remind ourselves that in an earlier era support came not only from the nuclear family but from extended family and community. The child moved in an environment filled with people concerned for his future - not always concerned in a kindly spirit, but concerned. A great many children today live in environments where virtually no one pays attention unless they break the law.

We have seen in recent years a troubling number of very successful, highly rewarded individuals in business and government engage in behavior that brought them crashing down. One explanation is that they betrayed their values for some gratification they couldn't resist (e.g., money, power, sensual pleasure). Another possible explanation is that they had no values to betray, that they were among the many contemporary individuals who had never had any roots in a framework of values, or had torn loose from their roots, torn loose from their moorings. Shame, after all, is a social emotion. Individuals who experience it feel that they have transgressed some group standard of propriety or right conduct. But if they have no sense of membership in any group, the basis for feeling ashamed is undermined. And there is an African proverb, "Where there is no shame, there is no honor."

In World War II studies of soldiers in combat, the most common explanation given for acts of extraordinary courage was "I didn't want to let my buddies down." Reflect on the number of individuals in this transient, pluralistic society who have no allegiance to any group, the members of which they would not want to let down.

We know a great deal about the circumstances of contemporary life that erode our sense of community. And we are beginning to understand how our passion for individualism led us away from community. But so far there has been very little considered advice to help us on the road back to community. Many of us are persuaded of the need to travel that road and have no doubt that it exists; but finding it will require that we be clear as to what we're seeking. We can never bring the traditional community back, and if we could it would prove to be hopelessly anachronistic.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITY

The traditional community was homogeneous. We live with heterogeneity and must design communities to handle it.

The traditional community experienced relatively little change from one decade to the next and resented the little that it did experience. We must design communities that can survive change and, when necessary, seek change.

The traditional community commonly demanded a high degree of conformity. Because of the nature of the world we live in, our communities must be pluralistic

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and adaptive, fostering individual freedom and responsibility within a framework of group obligation.

The traditional community was often unwelcoming to strangers and all too ready to reduce its communication with the external world. Hard realities require that present-day communities be in continuous and effective touch with the outside world, and our system of values requires that they be inclusive.

The traditional community could boast generations of history and continuity. Only a few communities today can hope to enjoy any such heritage. They must continuously rebuild their shared culture, must consciously foster the norms and values that will ensure their continued integrity.

In short, much as we cherish the thought of traditional community, we shall have to build anew, seeking to reincarnate some of the cherished values of the old communities in forms appropriate to contemporary social organization.

Most Americans who endorse the idea of community today have in mind communities that strive to exemplify the best of contemporary values, communities that are inclusive, that balance individual freedom and group obligation, that foster the release of human possibilities, that invite participation and the sharing of leadership tasks.

". . . we are beginning to understand how our passion for individualism led us away from community."

A glance at the contemporary scene reveals diverse kinds of community. Most familiar to us are territorially bounded communities such as towns, suburbs, neighborhoods, and so on, but we must look also at other kinds of community.

Some congregations create what I regard as genuine communities though their members may be scattered over a large metropolitan area. The workplace may constitute a community even though it draws its members from a wide area. Some of the smaller professional and academic fields and some religious orders are communities even though they may be very widely dispersed geographically. Some public schools are communities in the best sense of the word while others are simply geographical locations where young people spend a certain number of allotted hours performing required activities. The same appears true of congregations. Some are authentic communities, others are simply locations where unconnected people come together on Sunday. The same contrasts may be found in the workplace.

WHOLENESS AND BELONGING

In seeking to explain such differences one is driven to think analytically about the ingredients or characteristics of community. I shall list eight ingredients. The reader is invited to add to the list or define the ingredients in other ways. The important thing at this stage is to get past the generalized idea of community to an understanding of what conditions or circumstances make it real. In order to focus my study I chose four areas for special attention - the city, the workplace, the school, and the church. I shall draw examples from all four, trying not to confuse the reader in the process.

Wholeness incorporating diversity. A community is obviously less of a community if fragmentation or divisiveness exists and if the rifts are deep it is no community at all. Schools in which faculty and students carry on a kind of trench warfare, congregations divided into cliques, cities in which people of diverse ethnic origins form mutually hostile groups - these are obviously not healthy communities.

We expect and want diversity, and there will be dissension in the best of communities. But in vital communities, cooperation, compromise, and consensus building will be widely shared pursuits. In the best circumstances such communities will have instruments and processes for conflict resolution. Some cities have created special boards to deal with disputes between groups of citizens. Others have interracial councils and provisions for citizens from one segment of the community to know and work with citizens from other segments. Healthy communities respect diversity but seek common ground and a larger unity.

I have long advocated that in cities, leaders from all segments of the community come together in networks of responsibility to set goals and to tackle the city's most pressing problems. The community has a better chance of achieving wholeness if local government collaborates closely and continuously with private sector institutions, profit and nonprofit.

The skills necessary to the resolution of group conflict should be taught in both high school and college. All men and women in positions of leadership, govern-

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ment or private sector, should be schooled in dispute resolution and all of the antipolarization arts.

A shared culture. The possibility of wholeness is considerably enhanced if the community has a shared culture; i.e., shared norms and values. If the community is lucky (and fewer and fewer are), it will have a shared history and tradition. It will have symbols of group identity, its "story," its legends, and heroes. Social cohesion will be advanced if the group's norms and values are explicit. Values that are never expressed are apt to be taken for granted and not adequately conveyed to young people and newcomers. The well-functioning community provides many opportunities to express values in relevant action. If it believes, for example, that the individual should in some measure serve the community, it will provide many opportunities for young people to engage in such service .

To maintain the sense of belonging and the dedication and commitment so essential to community life, members needs inspiring reminders of shared goals and values. A healthy community affirms itself and builds morale and motivation through ceremonies and celebrations that honor the symbols of shared identity and enable members to rededicate themselves. This doesn't mean that they suppress internal criticism or deny their flaws.

One or another form of education about the community, its history, and its purpose is necessary to introduce young people to the shared past and present.

"WE" AND "THEY"

Good internal communication. Members of a well-functioning community communicate freely with one another. One of the advantages of the small group is that frequent face-to-face communication is possible. In large systems (cities, corporations) much conscious effort is needed to keep the channels of communication open among all elements of the system, and to combat the "we-they" barriers that impede the flow.

There must be occasions when members gather, there must be meeting spaces. In cities or neighborhoods there must be organizations willing to serve as meeting grounds.

Whatever the type of community, people have to believe that they can have their say. Between manager and worker, governing body and citizens, teacher and students, pastor and parishioners, there must be honest and open two-way communication. Each must understand what the other needs and wants.

In cities, much of the communication will be through the media. Civic leaders and institutions must urge the media toward responsible coverage, but it is a mistake to depend entirely on such urging. Leaders should create an information-sharing network among a wide variety of institutions and organizations. Maximum use should be made of institutions that can serve as neutral conveners - e.g., community foundations, community colleges, universities, churches. A community is strengthened if there are occasions (celebrations, retreats, outings, etc.) on which extensive informal interaction is possible.

Caring, trust, and teamwork. A good community nurtures its members and fosters an atmosphere of trust. They both protect and give a measure of autonomy to the individual. There is a spirit of mutuality and cooperation. Everyone is included.

Such attitudes make it possible to work together on necessary common tasks. Undergirding the teamwork is a widely shared commitment to the common good, an awareness by all that they need one another and must pool their talent, energy, and resources. There is a feeling that when the team wins everybody wins. Tasks that require the sharing of skills and resources foster the habit of collaboration, mutual support, and a willingness to put the good of the team first.

"Healthy communities respect diversity but seek common ground and a larger unity."

A healthy community deals forthrightly with dissension and "we-they" polarities, accepting diversity and dissent but using all the various mediating, coalition-building, and conflict resolution procedures to find common ground.

It is necessary to add that a community can be too tightly knit, suppressing dissent and constraining the creativity of its members.

LEADERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION

Group maintenance and government. A functioning community has institutional provisions for group maintenance or governing. In a corporation it is the board of directors, management, and the chain of command. In a college it is the trustees, administration, faculty council, and student government. In a town or city it is not only the formal governing mechanisms but the nongovernmental leadership exercised through various nonprofit institutions.

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One task is the maintenance of some reasonable measure of order and adherence to respected customs and norms. Violence, vandalism, crime, and drugs can destroy every vestige of community - as some urban public schools have discovered to their sorrow. Healthy communities ensure a safe environment for their members.

No less important is the reasonably efficient performance of community services. Community leaders may have the highest of civic ideals, but they also have to ensure that the garbage is collected, the streets maintained, the children educated, and so on. Collaboration between public and private sectors is essential to the performance of some of these tasks.

In a swiftly changing environment, communities and organizations must look ahead. The best of them engage in one or another form of strategic planning and priority setting, not through occasion one-shot "futures" reports but on a regular continuing basis. In cities, governments and the private sector must collaborate on such forward planning.

Participation and the sharing of leadership tasks. The culture of the healthy community encourages individual involvement in the pursuit of shared purposes. Cities can get significant participation from nongovernmental leaders through hearings, advisory boards, and citizen commissions. Strong neighborhood groups are important; and a wide range of nonprofit civic groups and institutions can play a role.

It is not uncommon in our towns and cities today that the groups most involved in the affairs of the community all come from one or two segments of the community. All segments must participate. In a city or an organization, the possibility of effective participation is increased if everyone is kept informed, and if individuals feel that they have a say. That means the system cannot be autocratically run or excessively centralized. Leaders must devolve initiative and responsibility widely throughout the system. We must never forget that our conception of community involves the participation of mature and responsible individuals. We don't want "community" bought at the price of the individual's mindless submission to the group. The good community will find a productive balance between individuality and group obligation.

Everyone need not participate actively with respect to any given community. We must guard the right to participate while recognizing that some will choose not to do so. Individuals expending enormous energies holding their families together may be thankfully passive members of their church congregation. The individual who is an activist in the workplace community may be a passive member of a neighborhood association.

LINKS TO THE FUTURE

Development of young people. In a community of the sort we would applaud, the opportunities for individual growth will be numerous and varied for all members. And mature members will ensure that young people grow up with a sense of obligation to the community. Beginning in elementary and high school, boys and girls will learn to take responsibility for the well-being of any group they are in - a seemingly small step but without doubt the first step toward responsible community participation, and for that matter the first step in leadership development. On the playing field, and in group activities in and out of school and college, they will learn teamwork. Through volunteer and intern experiences outside of school they will learn how the adult world works and will have the experience of serving their society. And they will learn that responsible dissent and creative alternative solutions may also serve the community. Every organization serving the community should find ways of involving young people.

Links with the outside world. The sound community has seemingly contradictory responsibilities: it must defend itself from the forces in the outside environment that undermine its integrity, yet it must maintain open, constructive, and extensive relations with the world beyond its boundaries. The school, for example, must be in some respects a haven for its students, capable of shutting out some of the most destructive aspects of city life, but it can maintain itself as a strong institution only through extensive community relations.

FRAGMENTATION AND COMMON GROUND

In listing these eight attributes of an ideal community, my interest is not in depicting Utopia. My interest is to get us away from vague generalizations about "community" and to identify some ingredients that we can work on constructively.

I've mentioned cities, neighborhoods, schools, churches, and the workplace. Many universities are to a deplorable degree "non-communities." Government agencies and a great variety of nonprofit institutions - museums, charities, cause organizations - have the same problem. The generalizations I have offered

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apply most easily and readily to social entities of moderate size. Obviously it is difficult to think in the same terms about a huge city, or a nation, or the world. Yet in those far-larger settings the need is even more desperate.

"We must never forget that our conception of community involves the participation of mature and responsible individuals."

The problem of the typical American city today is fragmentation. The list of the substantive problems of the city does not define the city's problem. The city's problem is that it can't pull itself together to deal with any item on the list. It is not a coherent entity. It is broken into segments that have sharply differing purposes, segments that have shown little talent for understanding one another. Or willingness to try.

Any effort by the city to accomplish some larger purpose gets mired in the tensions, cross-purposes, and ultimate stalemate among the segments. The city cannot think like a community nor can it act like one.

The soundest solution to the problem is for leaders from all segments, government and private sector, profit and nonprofit, to come together in what I call a network of responsibility to think about, to talk about, and act in behalf of their city. It happened in Pittsburgh in the 1950s and the modern Pittsburgh was born. It happened in New York City in the mid-1970s and the worst fiscal crisis in New York history was solved.

When it happens, there does indeed emerge a constituency for the whole. People come to realize that if the city goes downhill all segments suffer. Obviously all disagreements do not get settled, but the search for common ground achieves some success, and the very fact of searching creates a better climate.

Every institution in the city should have concern for the whole city, and not just concern for its segment of the city or, more commonly, concern solely for itself. Often even the most high-minded organizations have little regard for the community around them. I described the situation facetiously at a national meeting of voluntary organizations recently by saying: "A voluntary group may be profoundly and high-mindedly committed to care of the terminally ill and never notice that the community of which it is a part is itself 'terminally ill'." We must seek to restore a sense of community in our cities; but it may be that the most fruitful approach will be from the ground up, through the more familiar settings I discussed earlier - the school, the church, the workplace, and so on.

How can people work to make their metropolis a community when most of them have never experienced a sense of community in any familiar setting? Men and women who have come to understand, in their own intimate settings, the principles of "wholeness incorporating diversity," the arts of diminishing polarization, the meaning of teamwork and participation will be far better allies in the effort to build elements of community into the metropolis, the nation, and the world.

Problems will always torment us
because all important problems
are insoluble: that is why they
are important. The good comes
from the continuing struggle to
try and solve them, not from the
vain hope of their solution.

- Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.

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This call for black Americans to take up their opportunities as individuals rather than as minority group members is a departure from black politics since the Sixties, and questions the current push for "group rights." Shelby Steele is professor of English at San Jose State University in California. This essay, originally published by HARPER'S *magazine, is from* THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA, *copyright 1990 by St. Martin's Press.*

GHETTOIZED BY BLACK UNITY

by Shelby Steele

There are many profound problems facing black America today: a swelling black underclass; a black middle class that declined slightly in size during the Eighties; a declining number of black college students; an epidemic of teenage pregnancy, drug use, and gang violence; continuing chronic unemployment; astoundingly high college and high school dropout rates; an increasing number of single-parent families; a disproportionately high infant mortality rate; and so on. Against this despair it might seem almost esoteric for me to talk about the importance of individual identity and possibility. Yet I have come to believe that despite the existing racism in today's America, opportunity is still the single most constant but unexploited aspect of the black condition. The only way we will see the advancement of black people in this country is for us to focus on developing ourselves as individuals and embracing opportunity.

". . . opportunity is still the single most constant but unexploited aspect of the black condition."

I have come to this conclusion over time. In the late Sixties, I was caught up in the new spirit of black power and pride that swept over black America like one of those storms that change the landscape. I will always believe this storm was inevitable and, therefore, positive in many ways. What I gained from it was the power to be racially unapologetic, no mean benefit considering the long trial of patience that blacks were subjected to during the civil rights movement. But after a while, by the early Seventies, it became clear that black power did not offer much of a blueprint for how to move my life forward; it told me virtually nothing about who I was as an individual or how I might live in the world as myself. Of course, it was my mistake to think it could. But in the late Sixties, "blackness" was in invasive form of collective identity that cut so deeply into one's individual space that it seemed also to be an individual identity. It came as something of a disappointment to realize that the two were not the same, that being "black" in no way spared me the necessity of being myself.

In the early Seventies, without realizing it, I made a sort of bargain with the prevailing black identity - I subscribed in a general way to its point of view so that I could be free to get on with my life. Many blacks I knew did the same.

And what were we subscribing to? Generally, I think it was a form of black identity grounded in the spirit of black power. It carried a righteous anger at and mistrust of American society; it believed that blacks continued to be the victims of institutional racism, that we would have to maintain an adversarial stance toward society, and that a tight racial unity was necessary both for survival and advancement. This identity was, and is, predicated on the notion that those who burned you once will burn you again, and it presupposes a deep racist reflex in American life that will forever try to limit black possibility.

I think it was the space I cleared for myself by loosely subscribing to this identity that ultimately put me in conflict with it. It is in the day-to-day struggle of living on the floor of a society, so to speak, that one gains a measure of what is possible in that society. And by simply living as an individual in America - with my racial-identity struggle suspended temporarily - I discovered that American society offered me, and blacks in general, a remarkable range of opportunity if we were willing to pursue it.

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In my daily life I continue to experience racial indignities and slights: This morning I was told that blacks had too much musical feeling (soul, I suppose) to be good classical musicians; yesterday I passed two houses with gnomish black lawn jockeys on their front porches; my children have been called "nigger," as have I; I wear a tie and carry a briefcase so that my students on the first day of class will know I'm the professor; and so on. I also know that actual racial discrimination persists in many areas of American life. I have been the victor in one housing discrimination suit, as were my parents before me. My life is not immune to any of this, and I will never endure it with elan. Yet I have also come to realize that, in this same society, I have been more in charge of my fate than I ever wanted to believe and that though I have been limited by many things, my race was not foremost among them.

The point is that both realities exist simultaneously. There is still racial insensitivity and some racial discrimination against blacks in this society, but there is also much opportunity. What brought me into conflict with the prevailing black identity was that it was almost entirely preoccupied with the former to the exclusion of the latter. The black identity I was subscribing to in the Seventies - and that still prevails today - was essentially a "wartime" identity shaped in the confrontational Sixties. It saw blacks as victims even as new possibilities for advancement opened all around.

"I have been more in charge of my fate than I ever wanted to believe. . . "

Why do we cling to an adversarial, victim-focused identity and remain preoccupied with white racism? Part of the reason, I think, is that we carry an inferiority anxiety - an unconscious fear that the notion that we are inferior may, in fact, be true - that makes the seizing of opportunity more risky for us, since setbacks and failures may seem to confirm our worst fears. To avoid this risk we hold a victim-focused identity that tells us there is less opportunity than there actually is. And, in fact, our victimization itself has been our primary source of power in society - the basis of our demands for redress. The paradoxical result of relying on this source of power is that it rewards us for continuing to see ourselves as victims of a racist society and implies that opportunity itself is something to be given instead of taken.

This leaves us with an identity that is at war with our own best interests, that magnifies our oppression and diminishes our sense of possibility. I think this identity is a burden for blacks, because it is built around our collective insecurity rather than a faith in our human capacity to seize opportunity as individuals. It amounts to a self-protective collectivism that focuses on black unity instead of individual initiative. To be "black" in this identity, one need only manifest the symbols, postures, and rhetoric of black unity. Not only is personal initiative unnecessary for being "black" but the successful exercise of initiative - working one's way into the middle class, becoming well-off, gaining an important position - may, in fact, jeopardize one's "blackness," make one somehow less black.

"I believe that black leadership must recognize the importance of their individual initiative."

This sort of identity is never effective and never translates into the actual uplift of black people. Though it espouses black pride, it is actually a repressive identity that generates a victimized self-image, curbs individualism and initiative, diminishes our sense of possibility, and contributes to our demoralization and inertia. Uplift can only come when many millions of blacks seize the possibilities inside the sphere of their personal lives and use them to move themselves forward. Collectively we can resist oppression, but racial development will always be, as Ralph Ellison once put it, "the gift" of individuals.

There have been numerous government attempts at remedying the list of problems I mentioned earlier. Here and there a program has worked, many more have been failures. Clearly, we should find the ones that do work and have more of them. But my deepest feeling is that, in a society of increasingly limited resources, there will never be enough programs to meet the need. We black Americans will never be saved or even assisted terribly much by others, never be repaid for our suffering, and never find that symmetrical, historical justice that we cannot help but long for.

As Jean-Paul Sartre once said, we are the true "existential people." We have always had to create ourselves out of whole cloth and find our own means for survival. I believe that black leadership must recognize the importance of this individual initiative. They must

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preach it, tell it, sell it, and demand it. Our leadership has looked at government and white society very critically. Now they must help us look at ourselves. We need our real problems named and explained, otherwise we have no chance to overcome them. The impulse of our leaders is to be "political," to keep the society at large on edge, to keep them feeling as though they have not done enough for blacks. And, clearly, they have not. But the price these leaders pay for this form of "politics" is to keep blacks focused on an illusion of deliverance by others, and no illusion weakens us more. Our leaders must take a risk. They must tell us the truth, tell us of the freedom and opportunity they have discovered in their own lives. They must tell us what they tell their own children when they go home at night: to study hard, to pursue their dreams with discipline and effort, to be responsible for themselves, to have concern for others, to cherish their race and at the same time build their own lives as Americans. When our leaders put a spotlight on our victimization and seize upon our suffering to gain us ineffectual concessions, they inadvertently turn themselves into enemies of the truth, not to mention enemies of their own people.

I believe that black Americans are freer today than ever before. This is not a hope; this is a reality. Racial hatred has not yet left the American landscape. Who knows how or when this will occur. And yet the American black, supported by a massive body of law and, for the most part, the goodwill of his fellow citizens, is basically as free as he or she wants to be. For every white I have met who is a racist, I have met twenty more who have seen me as an individual. This, I am not ashamed to say, has been my experience. I believe it is time for blacks to begin the shift from a wartime to a peacetime identity, from fighting for opportunity to seizing it. The immutable fact of late-twentieth century American life is that it is there for blacks to seize. Martin Luther King did not live to experience this. But then, of course, on the night before he died, he seemed to know that he would not. From the mountaintop he had looked over and seen the promised land, but he said, "I may not get there with you..." I won't say we are snuggled deep in the promised valley he saw beyond the mountain; everyday things remind me that we are not. But I also know we have it better than our greatest leader. We are on the other side of his mountaintop, on the downward slope toward the valley he saw. This is something we ought to know. But what we must know even more clearly is that nothing on this earth can be promised except a chance. The promised land guarantees nothing. It is only an opportunity, not a deliverance.

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BALANCE OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES: A Book Review

THE BROKEN CORD by Michael Dorris.

New York: Harper and Row 1989.

I was impelled to read *The Broken Cord* after watching the author interviewed on a TV talk show and feeling the glimmer of recognition that as he spoke and wrote about "Adam" he may well be telling me something about one of our adopted grandsons.

The Broken Cord is an account of Dorris' struggle to understand, to find out more about Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, and to cope with his adopted son's malfunctions...an account that is told with such openness that it would engage the heart of any sensitive person whether or not those symptoms were found among his or her acquaintances.

But to recognize the possibilities for damage to the fetus through the mother's ingestion of even a small amount of alcohol also forces us to look at a troubling area of rights and responsibilities: the right of the child to come into the world with all the personal advantages that nature would like to provide; the right of the mother to do as she wishes to amuse or tranquilize herself.

A product and student of the Native American community, Dorris can show us how two cultures wrestle with such issues... how two versions of the "social contract" might try to cope with the human devastation inherent in a woman's consumption of drugs during her child-bearing years. His research led him to the realization that FAS and FAE have been surmised and counseled about in most of Western culture as far back as Ancient Greece.

Dorris' wife, a well-known author as well, gives an impassioned plea for the child in her foreword and expresses the hope that education might help eradicate this preventable tragedy, but she (Louise Erdrich) and husband Michael have understood how some activists could advocate jail terms for pregnant women who refuse to stop drinking during pregnancy.

I recommend *The Broken Cord* as a personal story, admirably told and exhaustively researched, that will add one more example to our human dilemma to keep rights and duties in balance in the course of our social covenanting. (R.K.)

> *"In anthropological theory there is a concept called "the superorganic" which is based upon the premise that members of a culture derive their worldview from the same pool of historically generated assumptions. To live harmoniously in society, we must construe a roughly similar future."*
>
> *Michael Dorris in* The Broken Cord

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